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NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE.l 
BY PROF. L. LEVY-BRUHL. 
MALEBRANCHE was a philosopher, to use Plato's beautiful expression, from his whole soul. Far from raising a kind of 
impenetrable partition between his religious faith and his rational 
thought, he did not even conceive the possibility of a conflict be-
tween faith and philosophy, if the latter were genuine. "I am 
persuaded, Ariste, that one has need to be a sound philosopher in 
order to find one's way in the understanding of the truths of faith, 
and that the better fortified one is in the true principles of meta-
physics, the more steadfastly will one cling to the truths of reli-
gion." These few words sum up the program which Malebranche 
endeavored to carry out, or, more exactly, the jJostulatum, the 
truth of which his whole philosophy seeks to establish. 
To this end it was necessary for him to introduce new elements 
between Catholic dogma and the Cartesian rationalism, which 
would enable him to pass insensibly from the one to the other. 
These elements almost spontaneously offered themselves to him in 
Augustine, whose doctrine was particularly studied by the congre-
gation of the Oratory, to which Malebranche belonged. With the 
help of Augustine, he dived deep into ancient philosophy, from 
which he chiefly borrowed Platonic notions, and towards whose 
notions the natural bent of his mind inclined him. Thus the tra-
dition which Descartes thought to have definitely interrupted be-
tween the ancient and the modern philosophy was renewed with 
the very first generation which sprang from him, at the hands of 
his most illustrious successor. But Malebranche did not make him-
self a slave to Plato as Scholasticism had been to Aristotle. On the 
contrary, the mixture, or rather, blending, of these Platonic ele-
1 Extracts from a forthcoming work on the History iii" Modern Frenc" PMlosop"y. 
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ments with the Cartesian principles gave to Malebranche's writings 
an original flavor. The great work with which Malebranche busied 
himself for ten years, and which appeared in 1674, was entitled La 
Recherche de la vlritl. 
First of all, whoever undertakes such a research is to make a 
careful distinction between rational evidence, the only sign of 
truth, and the false light of the senses, which, in spite of its appar-
ent clearness, gives but deceitful information. Our senses produce 
vivid impressions upon us, but do not enlighten us. The light of 
reason, which on the contrary seems cold, makes us see things as 
they really are. Therefore, we must close the eyes of the body, 
and accustom ourselves to see only with the mind's eye. 
This precept is often expressed in language which reminds 
us of Plato's Socrates in the Phado, and represents the body as a 
principle of trouble and darkness, offensive to the natural clear-
sightedness of the soul, which it binds down to grossly deceitful 
appearances, leaving behind it but an imperfect reminiscence of 
eternal realities, being, in fact, a sort of poison, from which the 
wise man's soul yearns to be released. Malebranche likewise 
speaks of the tumult of the senses hindering the soul from heark-
ening to the voice of reason. He then insensibly passes on from 
the Platonic to the Christian point of view. The soul's subservi-
ence to the body becomes a consequence of the original fall; the 
dominancy of the senses over the spirit is said to be the result of 
sin, and the soul's possession of truth to be communion with God. 
"The spirit stands, so to speak, between God and the body, be-
tween good and evil, between what enlightens and what blinds it, 
what rules it well and what rules it ill, what makes it perfect and 
happy and what is apt to make it imperfect and unhappy." 
Thus, according to Malebranche, as well as to Plato, philoso-
phy first requires the soul to move to a different position from that 
which it occupied before reflecting. Things which are visible and 
tangible, which may be tasted and smelt, it first believed to be real: 
it shall henceforth look upon them as illusory. Things, on the con-
trary, which are neither seen nor touched, but purely intelligible, 
it shall look upon as alone real. Malebranche has no difficulty in 
bringing out the truth of this precept, even on Descartes's princi-
ples. He shows that the secondary qualities of bodies are all rel-
ative to the thinking subject. That property alone belongs to body 
which we conceive by means of our understanding-i. e., exten-
sion. Our senses therefore teach us nothing. We think we see the 
room in which we are. We think we see the sun. It is a delusion 
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and it is certain that we do not. It is not even possible to under-
stand how we could see them; for in what way could such mate-
rial objects act upon the immaterial soul, while there is nothing 
in common between it and them? 
Shall we then entirely reject the notions of our senses as false 
and deceitful? No, says Malebranche; our senses are neither de-
ceitful nor corrupted, if we make use of them only as regards their 
proper function; that is, the preservation of the body. They fulfil 
their duty admirably well, speedily warn the soul by means of pain 
and pleasure, by means of pleasant and unpleasant tastes, of what 
it must do or refrain from doing for the preservation of life ..... 
They represent instinct in us, and have its blind unerringness. 
Were we to ward off by means of reflexion the various dangers 
which threaten our body at every moment, we should very soon 
perish. The senses are marvelously well suited for this office, and 
in most cases it is sufficient for us to trust to their spontaneous ac-
tivity. But let us require nothing more from them! Valuable as 
they are for our preservation they are incapable of teaching us. 
Many of our errors arise from our neglecting to make this distinc-
tion. As our senses do not deceive us concerning what is profit-
able or harmful, we fall into the habit of trusting to them in all 
things, even where they may lead us astray. 
This impulse is almost unavoidable. In order to make us 
heedful of the warnings given by the senses, God caused them to 
be attended with pleasure and pain. A pin's prick, though con-
veying no distinct information (for we do not even know what takes 
place here in the nerves and brain), produces upon us a most 
vivid impression, and compels us to give our attention to it. \Ve 
thus form the habit of judging of the reality of things by their prac-
tical interest for us; that is, we trust to the senses in order to 
know what things are, and we are mistaken. 
If, therefore, we are really acquainted with "outward ob-
jects," it is not by means of sensations, since these are dim and 
unfit to instruct us. It is by means of ideas-i. e., of representa-
tions clear to the understanding and which have nothing in com-
mon with sensations. Ideas are in God, and the mind perceives 
them in God. When it discovers any truth, or sees things as they 
are in themselves, it sees them in God's ideas-that is, with a 
clear and distinct vision of what is in God, who represents them. 
Thus, every time the mind knows the truth it is united with God; 
in some manner it knows and possesses God. 
For the demonstration of this celebrated theory of "Vision 
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in God," Malebranche leans upon the Cartesian principles. He 
defines the soul as that which thinks, and the body as that which 
has extension. The instinct of feeling persuades us that these two 
are united, and we have no doubts about it. But we have no evi-
dence either, and we even see quite plainly that the mind and the 
body are two beings of quite opposite kinds. We do not, then, un-
derstand how something corporeal-that is, something which has 
extension-can produce upon the soul an impression which should 
be called knowledge, or how the soul can go out of itself to 
"aller se promener dans les deux." 1 The object of knowledge, there-
fore, can be nothing else than an idea. When I perceive the sun, 
for instance, whether it be above the horizon or not, whether I be 
awake or dreaming, matters little. In one case, no doubt, my per-
ception is true, and in the other false, and we are not without a 
means of distinguishing between them; but it is never the mate-
rial object that I perceive, it is always the idea of the object that 
offers itself to my soul. 
Beset by the objections raised against him, Malebranche gave 
several successive forms to his theory of the vision of ideas in God. 
We cannot here make a distinction between them; let it be suffi-
cient to mention the chief arguments on behalf of this theory. He 
examines, one after another, all the hypotheses which may explain 
our knowledge of ideas. He first eliminates the theory of "sensi-
ble images," which had been preserved from antiquity by scholastic 
philosophers. This hypothesis increases, instead of solving, diffi-
culties, and one cannot understand how sensible images, being 
something material, could be transformed into something spiritual, 
as ideas are. Does, then, the human soul produce ideas spon-
taneously? It is mere human pride that imagines that the soul 
can produce anything. Such a supposition would imply that it was 
endowed with causality. Now, as will soon be shown, no creature 
is a cause. God alone acts in the Universe. Shall we say that 
ideas were created by God, together with the soul? A very im-
probable hypothesis, and not easily made to agree with God's wis-
wisdom, as it would suppose "infinities of infinite numbers of 
ideas" to exist in each created soul. Is it not far more reasonable 
to suppose that ideas are eternally subsisting in God? We know 
them when God deems it fit for them to be discovered to us. This 
hypothesis is hot only the most "economical," but also the one 
which best enables us to perceive the state of dependency we are 
in with regard to God. All llpalle ellCQmp~~~es bodies, so does God 
1 Roam through the heavens. 
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encompass minds. To know is to partake of divine intelligence. 
The ideas which represent God's creatures to our minds are but 
God's perfections corresponding to these very creatures and repre-
sentative of them. 
We perceive ideas only by means of pure understanding; for 
the world of ideas is a purely intellectual world to which the 
senses have no access. The worst sort of confusion would follow 
from mistaking sensations, which Malebranche terms the modali-
ties of our soul, for ideas, which are within divine intelligence. 
But the mistake is impossible, so completely do the features of 
modalities contrast with those of ideas. The modalities of the soul 
are changeable, ideas are immutable; modalities are particular, 
ideas are universal; modalities are contingent, ideas are eternal 
and necessary j modalities are dim and obscure, and ideas are very 
clear and lucid; modalities are but dimly though keenly felt, and 
ideas are clearly known, being the foundation of all sciences. And 
not only do we see in God the ideas of "outward" objects, but we 
also see in Him the axioms of reason; and such truths as Bossuet, 
after Augustine, termed eternal. 
The hypothesis of the Vision in God, the most, and indeed the 
only probable one, according to Malebranche, seems to our com-
mon sense wonderfully paradoxical. It called forth the taunts of 
his contemporaries, and the well-known line: 
" Lui qui voit tout en Dieu n'y voit pas qu'il est fou." 1 
Yet it is a direct consequence of the principles of Descartes; and 
the theories of Spinoza and Leibniz on this point, though different 
in expression, are not very remote from that of Malebranche. Des-
cartes had proved that we are not made acquainted with objects by 
our senses, but by our understanding; and that matter, to the in-
tuition of the mind, is nothing else than extension. Now the sci-
ence of extension is geometry. It is composed of truths which ap-
pear to the mind as universal and necessary. Kant denominates 
them" a priori,." Malebranche calls them immutable and eternal. 
Where is the primary cause of these truths, and consequently of 
the whole physical world? Evidently not in my individual under-
standing, which is finite and perishable. It can be only in an un-
derstanding which is as eternal and necessary as those truths them-
selves. Descartes had already said that all our science is true only 
because God exists. Malebranche went a step farther, and as-
serted that there is no science save through our participation in di-
1" He who sees all things in God, sees not his own lunacy there." 
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vine thought. We see the truth only when we see things as they 
really are, which we never do unless we see them in Him who 
comprises them intelligibly. 
Malebranche, as a good Cartesian, has a purely geometrical 
and mechanical conception of nature. "With extension alone," 
he says, "God has produced all the admirable things we see in na-
ture, and even what gives life and movement to animals." Yet, 
though Malebranche agreed with Descartes in saying that animals 
are machines and" do not feel," he was visibly attentive to the 
discoveries just made by Swammerdam, Leeuwenhoek, and many 
other scientific men with the help of the newly-invented micro-
scrope. The theory of "encased germs," though he accepted 
it with Leibniz as the most plausible theory of the time, leaves 
him only half satisfied. He easily understands how, by the mere 
power of mechanical laws, the tiny tree hidden in the seed will 
grow progressively and gradually become the tall oak which we 
behold. No doubt the actual division of matter goes far beyond 
the reach of our senses, and it is probably the same with the or-
ganisation of matter. A drop of liquid, Leibniz says, is a pond 
full of fishes, and every drop of blood in one of those fishes is an-
other pond full of fishes, and so on ad infinitum. Malebranche also 
concedes this, but he cannot so easily account for species' be-
ing preserved, each apart from the others, in their minutest fea-
tures, by the power of purely mechanical laws. He does not see 
as plainly as Descartes does that with matter and the laws of mo-
tion one can completely account for a world similar to ours, includ-
ing plants and animals. He would suppose something to exist be-
sides, not unlike Plato's ideas, "divine models," "archetypes," 
which live forever in God's understanding, and which determine 
his choice among possible things. The permanence of species 
would seem to him inexplicable otherwise. Malebranche here 
stands half-way between Descartes and Leibniz. He begins, as 
the former does, with a geometrical conception of the science of 
nature; and almost finishes, as the latter, with a metaphysical 
conception, the predominant ideas of which are order and har-
mony. 
Weare hereby brought back to God. The sight of nature 
everywhere compels us to admire the simplicity and fecundity of 
her ways. Malebranche vividly feels the beauty of nature. But, 
as most men did in his time, what he feels above all in her beauty 
is the reason which it ClI:prC55t15, He ~ee~ al~Q there, above all 
things, order. The idea of order is almost the central one in the 
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philosophy of Malebranche; not only is it the very principle of his 
ethics, but it holds a no less important place in his metaphysical 
speculations. He conceives reality to be an assemblage of "or-
ders," corresponding and subordinate to one another. Above the 
order of the physical world rises the order of moral realities: the 
one being ruled by the laws of the magnitude or quantity, the 
other by the laws of quality or perfection. The order of grace 
comes next, not to change but to mend the order of nature. Even 
in the attributes and perfections of divine essence, order also 
reigns. All these "orders" converge in harmonious unity, of 
which our feeble understanding can have but a very imperfect 
glimpse. They have caused Malebranche's system to be compared 
to a magnificent palace-a vast and noble building, the richness 
and majesty of which, while flattering the imagination, give reason 
cause for supreme gratification. They might also be compared to 
the grand choral constructions of J. S. Bach, who also reaches to 
the sublime by the harmonious richness of a powerful development 
in which order always predominates. 
Everything that is, owes its being to God; all that we know, 
we know in God. But how do we know God Himself? How are 
we made sure of His existence? What do we know of His nature 
and attributes? In what measure can we understand His relation 
to the world? 
In such a philosophy as that of Malebranche the existence of 
God is not called in question. From the very first step which rea-
son tries to take this idea demands acquiescence. If I am, God 
is; if I think, God is; if I know any truth, God is; if any phe-
nomenon takes place, God is. Nothing can be or can appear with-
out a cause, and there is no other cause than God. Therefore 
Malebranche might look upon a demonstration of the existence of 
God as superfluous. Yet he gives proof of it, and he even thinks 
that some of his arguments usually proffered are not worthless. 
He does not reject the proof based on final causes. The contem-
plation of the order which reigns in nature often fills him with ad-
miration for the Author of so much splendor, inasmuch as there 
can be no doubt but some mind must be postulated to explain it. 
He reasons on this point as afterwards Voltaire did. When I 
see a watch, I am right in concluding that there is intelligence 
back of it, as mere chance cannot possibly have produced and 
combined all the wheels. How then could it be possible for chance 
and the meeting together of atoms to be capable of arranging in all 
men and animals the many various springs, accurate and well pro-
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portioned, which we see in them, and for men and animals to beget 
others in their exact likeness. 
This proof produces a strong impression upon souls; but 
Malebranche was aware that, from a logical point of view, it is not 
unimpeachable. The most beautiful, the noblest and strongest 
proof that may be given of the existence of God is drawn from our 
idea of the infinite. That we have this idea, is an undoubted fact. 
Even those who deny the existence of God have this idea, even 
while denying. Not only does the human mind conceive the 
idea of the infinite, but it conceives it even before the idea of 
the finite. For the idea of the infinite is given us together with the 
very idea of being. In order to form an idea of a finite being, 
we subtract something from the general idea of being, which must 
therefore be considered as an anterior one. Fenelon likewise says 
afterwards that, in spite of appearances, the idea of the infinite is 
positive, and the idea of the finite negative, since the former rep-
resents being as unlimited and the latter represents it as limited-
i. e., with a negation of what is beyond the limit. Therefore, Male-
branche concludes, the mind perceives nothing save through the 
idea it has of the infinite, and all particular ideas are but partici-
pations in the general idea of the infinite. And from this he dem-
onstrates in several ways the necessary existence of God. 
* 
* * 
There is but one cause in the universe, and that is God. For 
a cause is that which produces or engenders an effect, and brings 
it to pass. Being a cause, then, means creating something, a 
power which belongs to God alone. Therefore, to suppose that a 
creature may be the cause of anything whatever, is to make it di-
vine and to participate in the most dangerous error of the ancient 
philosophy. It means falling into the sin of pride, and failing to 
recognise the dependency in which all creatures are towards God. 
This appears evident enough if we consider only the essence of 
God, that of creatures, and the notion of cause. 
The universe known to us is composed of spirits and bodies; 
that is to say, of thinking souls, and of extended substances. Male-
branche seeks to prove that a spirit never acts upon a body, nor a 
body upon a spirit, nor a body upon a body. Spirits indeed are in 
communication with one another, but only through God; for God 
encompasses all spirits as space encompasses all bodies. 
To say that the spirit never acts upon the bodr may at first 
seem contrary to what experience shows. If I will move my arm, 
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I move it; is not my volition the cause of the motion of my arm? 
No, answers Malebranche, unless you simply mean by "cause" 
the antecedent which constantly precedes a given phenomenon. 
But if the word" cause" means to you" what produces" the phe-
nomenon, when you say that your volition is the cause of the mo-
tion of your arm, you go beyond what is known to you. All that 
you are conscious of is your volition, accompanied by a confused 
feeling of effort, and then the motion of your arm. But that the 
volition produces the motion is so little evident that you have no 
idea of the way in which it is done. In order to move your arm, 
you must have some animal spirits, and send them through certain 
nerves into certain muscles which they swell or shorten, for this is 
how the arm attached to them can move, or else, as some others 
think, we do not yet know how it is done. And we see that men 
who do not even know whether they have spirits, nerves, and mus-
cles, move their arms, and indeed move them more skilfully and 
easily than those who are most versed in anatomy. Therefore, to 
say that my volition is the cause of the motion of my arm, is to 
give of the fact an explanation which I do not even understand, 
and which is a wrong one. But to say that God has willed it, that 
every time I have this or that volition, this or that motion is to 
take place in my arm, is to give an intelligible and satisfactory ex-
planation, for it is sure that God is an effectual cause. So my vo-
lition is but the occasional cause of the motion of my arm. God is 
the real cause. A veritable cause, Malebranche says with deep 
meaning, is a cause between which and its effect the mind per-
ceives a necessary connexion. Now, this necessary connexion I do 
not perceive between my volition and my movements. Experience 
alone makes it known to me. 
* 
* * Such then is the greatest, the most fruitful and the most neces-
saryof all principles. We find in the universe but the occasional 
causes of the effects which God Himself produces. And as God 
does not act by means of particular volitions, He has regulated all 
the "infinitely infinite" combinations of physical with physical, 
and of physical with moral things in such a way that phenomena 
appear to us as subjected to necessary laws, and that like antece-
dents are always followed by like consequents. We may indeed go 
on using the current language; we may say that the soul moves its 
body, that it is touched by the impression the body receives, and 
that bodies in motion transmit to each other part of their speed. 
We may do this, just as we say that the sun rises or sets. It is 
------ --------
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sufficient that we should know that all the causes we speak of are 
purely occasional, and that the only real cause is God. 
This remarkable theory marks a decisive stage in the history 
of philosophy. With regard to the past, it achieves the Cartesian 
revolution, and consummates the defeat of scholastic physics. Al-
ready Descartes, in his conception of nature, did not suppose any 
force or power, but chose to explain all phenomena by the laws of 
motion only. It is the very idea of "nature" that Malebranche 
attacks. The religion of the ancients made nature divine. The 
philosophy of Aristotle saw in the CPVUt'i the inward power which 
gives to beings their shape and growth, and builds the ascending 
scale of genera and species. Malebranche shows that nature is but 
a word, a delusion, which the philosophy of clear ideas drives 
away. "lowe nothing to my nature, nothing to the imaginary 
nature of philosophers. I owe everything to God and His decrees." 
Natural causality is the last of occult qualities; it must disappear 
like the others. God has linked His works together, but He has 
not produced between them any linking entities. In short, Male-
branche, as a worthy successor of Descartes, replaces the con-
fused scholastic notion of cause by the clear scientific notion of 
law. 
In this he forestalls the future. Prior to Hume and Kant he 
made clear the importance of the idea of causality in metaphysics. 
His criticism of the common notion of cause is a masterly one. 
Hume does not excel him in showing that the connexion between 
cause and effect escapes us precisely where we think we take hold 
of it, and that it therefore cannot be a notion given by experi-
ence. 
Malebranche speaks a metaphysical and theological language. 
Strip his thought of this form, preserve the matter and give it a 
positive expression, and no theory of causality agrees with the 
spirit and practice of modern sciences better than his. Bacon first, 
and Descartes afterwards, had already recognised that the science 
of nature need not seek after final causes. Malebranche goes a 
step further. He exempts it from seeking even after efficient 
causes. Science henceforth will only have to determine constant 
successions, "reciprocal modalities;" and to state how such and 
such a phenomenon varies when such another phenomenon under-
goes a given change. Now, this is exactly the point of view of 
modern physics. This science has wisely ceased to inquire why 
opium makes us sleep, and restricted its attention to phenomena 
and the laws of phenomena. What Malebranche says ot the rela-
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tion between body and soul, and of the action which bodies exer-
cise upon one another, is no less apt to please our scientific men. 
On this point none ever contributed more than this great metaphy-
sician to purge positive science of the popular metaphysics which 
for so long a time falsified its definitions and paralysed its pro-
gress. In this sense, the theory of occasional causes is a worthy 
sequel to the Cartesian theory of science. 
* 
* * 
Malebranche's ethics is closely linked to the rest of his sys-
tem, being, like the latter, both rational and Christian. Silence 
your senses, imagination, and passions, and you shall hear the 
pure voice of the inward truth, the clear and evident answers of 
our common Master. He does not teach us only what we are to 
believe, but also what we are to do. He reveals to us what is beau-
tiful and good, together with what is true, for he shows us the rel-
ative degrees of perfection between things, and the order in which 
we should prefer them one to another. Above all, he shows us 
the very principle of order-i. e., the supremely wise and kind Be-
ing, who gives us existence, thought, and will. When we lavish 
upon finite beings the love which God gives us for Himself, unless 
He has so ordained it; in a word, when we disobey Him, we do 
evil and we are sinful. Shall we say that it is God-being the only 
cause in the universe-who acts within us, and we are not respon-
sible for our sins? that He has permitted, if not decreed, them? 
Malebranche replies to this formidable objection. No doubt we 
have no existence or activity but by God's will. His will, most 
certainly, makes us seek our own happiness, but it does not make 
us seek it in the gratification of the senses rather than in obedience 
to Himself. If being able to sin is a power, this power we have. 
We have sufficient liberty not to cast on the all-perfect Being the 
responsibility for our sins. God is just, and we were all born un-
der the curse of original sin. 
We shall not follow Malebranche through his theological ex-
planations. Let us come back to the purely human domain of 
moral things, and observe that he has spoken of these with re-
markable aptness and penetration. This" meditative" man is a 
keen observer of human nature. Such parts of the Recherche de la 
l}(irite as bear upon the errors caused by our imagination, inclina-
tion, or passions, are justly celebrated. Being pleasant and lively, 
they contributed in no small degree to the success of the work. 
They won to it a great many readers who, though not engrossed in 
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metaphysics, were charmed by the originality and liveliness of the 
author's moral reflexions. 
Malebranche often opposes his ethics to that of the Stoics. 
The latter in his eyes represent heathenish pride, and their virtues 
are but vices to a Christian soul that knows nature to be powerless 
without God. He combats their paradoxes, he maintains that pain 
is an evil, and that men must needs seek after happiness. Nor 
does he agree that man, in his present state, being closely bound 
to the body, can suppress its passions; and this indeed is no duty, 
as passions are not essentially evil. Only we do not make use of 
our passions as we should. There are rightful passions, as, for in-
stance, a desire to discover the truth, to acquire sufficient light to 
regulate our behavior, to be useful to others, etc.; there are also 
wrong or dangerous ones, as a desire to acquire reputation, to gain 
wealth in life, to rise above our fellow-creatures ..... And it 
often happens that even our most injudicious passions more 
strongly urge us to seek after truth, and afford us more pleasant 
consolations for the pains we find therein than the most righteous 
and judicious passions would. Malebranche excels in discovering 
the hidden motives of human actions; in pointing out the means 
of combating them when we must, and of turning them to good ac-
count when we can. He has a most delicate psychological sense, 
though his clear-sightedness may occasionally be unmerciful. The 
passage in which he brings to light the vanity of Montaigne is a 
little masterpiece. 
A general view of Malebranche's works shows that he carried 
out_ the programme he had set for himself_ He made good the con-
formity of his rational doctrine with the Christian dogma, without 
the latter being altered, and without reason being obliged to give 
up its rights. This accordance is not brought about by dialectical 
tricks, by prodigious feats of dexterity and suppleness, leaving 
upon the reader's mind an uncomfortable feeling of perplexity. 
We do not wonder, as we sometimes do with Leibniz, whether 
the author is entirely sincere, and whether he does not seek the 
reconciliation merely for the sake of peace. Malebranche produces 
quite another impression, and a perfectly genuine one. We feel 
that he puts his whole soul and faith into his philosophy. "0 
Theodore! " he exclaims in one of his finest Entretiens sur la meta-
physique, "how clear your principles are, how solid, how worthy of 
a Christian! But how lovely and touching they are also!" Male-
branche's philosophical reflexion is perfectly sincere. He is 
checked by no after-thought and paralysed by no diffidence. He 
--------~--- -
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shrinks from no rightfully deduced consequences. What need has 
he to fear, since reason and the divine Word are one? Then rea-
son cannot, if its method is sound, come to any conclusion which 
may alarm a Christian conscience. 
An admirable metaphysical system was the fruit of such can-
did boldness and pious temerity. Malebranche was thereby ena-
bled to say, as a Christian, a great part of what Spinoza said as a 
free-thinker. He could, at the same time, be the idealist that had 
not distinctly appeared in Descartes; and that he was, with a fine 
passion for logic. He paved the way for Berkeley, Hume, and 
Kant. His glory, while he lived, was great, and his influence re-
mained considerable in the eighteenth century in France and in 
England. In our days, his doctrine seems to have sunk somewhat 
into the background, between Descartes, from whom he proceeds, 
and the idealist philosophers who came after him. But while 
these philosophers owe to him many of their leading ideas, Male-
branche still has the merit, rare in all countries and unique in 
France, of having constituted a religious philosophy which is not 
merely a philosophy inspired by religion. 
